Introduction
The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) [RFC3711] is a profile of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) [RFC3550] , which can provide confidentiality, message authentication, and replay protection to the RTP traffic and to the control traffic for RTP, the Real-time Transport Control Protocol (RTCP). It is important to note that the outgoing SRTP packets from a single endpoint may be originating from several independent data sources.
Authenticated encryption [BN00] is a form of encryption that, in addition to providing confidentiality for the plaintext that is encrypted, provides a way to check its integrity and authenticity. Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data, or AEAD [R02] , adds the ability to check the integrity and authenticity of some Associated Data (AD), also called "additional authenticated data", that is not encrypted. This specification makes use of the interface to a generic AEAD algorithm as defined in [RFC5116] .
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a block cipher that provides a high level of security, and can accept different key sizes. Two families of AEAD algorithm families, AES Galois/Counter Mode (AES-GCM) [GCM] and AES Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code (AES-CCM) [RFC3610] , are based upon AES. This specification makes use of the AES versions that use 128-bit and 256-bit keys, which we call AES-128 and AES-256, respectively.
The Galois/Counter Mode of operation (GCM) and the Counter with Cipher Block Chaining-Message Authentication Code mode of operation (CCM) are both AEAD modes of operation for block ciphers. Both use counter mode to encrypt the data, an operation that can be efficiently pipelined. Further, GCM authentication uses operations that are particularly well suited to efficient implementation in hardware, making it especially appealing for high-speed implementations, or for implementations in an efficient and compact circuit. CCM is well suited for use in compact software implementations. This specification uses GCM and CCM with both AES-128 and AES-256.
In summary, this document defines how to use AEAD algorithms, particularly AES-GCM and AES-CCM, to provide confidentiality and message authentication within SRTP and SRTCP packets.
Conventions Used In This Document
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119] .
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3. Overview of the SRTP/SRTCP Security Architecture SRTP/SRTCP security is based upon the following principles: a) Both privacy and authentication are based upon the use of symmetric algorithms. An AEAD algorithm such as AES-CCM or AES-GCM combines privacy and authentication into a single process.
b) A secret master key is shared by all participating endpoints, both those originating SRTP/SRTCP packets and those receiving these packets. Any given master key MAY be used simultaneously by several endpoints to originate SRTP/SRTCP packets (as well one or more endpoints using this master key to process inbound data).
c) A Key Derivation
Function is applied to the shared master key value to form separate encryption keys, authentication keys and salting keys for SRTP and for SRTCP (a total of six keys). This process is described in sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3 of [RFC3711] . Since AEAD algorithms such as AES-CCM and AES-GCM combine encryption and authentication into a single process, AEAD algorithms do not make use of the authentication keys. The master key MUST be at least as large as the encryption key derived from it. d) Each time an instantiation of AES-GCM or AES-CCM is invoked to encrypt and authenticate an SRTP or SRTCP data packet a new IV is used. SRTP combines the 4-octet synchronization source (SSRC) identifier, the 4-octet rollover counter (ROC), and the 2-octet sequence number(SEQ) with the 12-octet encryption salt to form a 12-octet IV (see section 9.1). SRTCP combines the SSRC and 31-bit SRTCP index with the encryption salt to form a 12-octet IV (see section 10.1).
Terminology
The following terms have very specific meanings in the context of this RFC:
Crypto Context: For the purposes of this document, a crypto context is the outcome of any process which results in authentication of each endpoint in the SRTP session and possession by each endpoint of a shared secret master key. Various encryption keys, authentication keys and salts are derived from the master key. Aside from making modifications to IANA registries to allow AES-GCM and AES-CCM to work with SDES, DTLS and MIKEY, the details of how the master key is established May 20, 2013 are outside the scope of this document. Similarly any mechanism for rekeying an existing Cipher Context is outside the scope of the document.
Instantiation:
In AEAD, an instantiation is an (Encryption_key, salt) pair together with all of the data structures (for example, counters) needed for it to function properly. In SRTP/SRTCP, each endpoint will need two instantiations of the AEAD algorithm for each master key in its possession, one instantiation for SRTP traffic and one instantiation for SRTCP traffic.
Invocation: SRTP/SRTCP data streams are broken into packets. Each packet is processed by a single invocation of the appropriate instantiation of the AEAD algorithm.
In many applications, each endpoint will have one master key for processing outbound data but may have one or more separate master keys for processing inbound data.
Generic AEAD Processing
Types of Input Data
Associated Data: This is data that is to be authenticated but not encrypted.
Plaintext:
Data that is to be both encrypted and authenticated.
Raw Data:
Data that is to be neither encrypted nor authenticated.
Which portions of SRTP/SRTCP packets that are to be treated as associated data, which are to be treated as plaintext, and which are to be treated as raw data are covered in sections 9.2, 10.2 and 10.3. The Tag_Size_Flag, used in AES-CCM authentication, has the hex value 5A if an 8-octet authentication tag is used, 6A if a 12-octet authentication tag is used, and 7A if a 16-octet authentication tag is used. This flag refers to the size of the intrinsic authentication tag provided by the AEAD algorithm.
AEAD Invocation
Handling of AEAD Authentication
AEAD requires that all incoming packets MUST pass AEAD authentication before any other action takes place. Plaintext and associated data MUST NOT be released until the AEAD authentication tag has been validated. Further, when GCM is being used, the ciphertext MUST NOT be decrypted until the AEAD tag has been validated.
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Should the AEAD tag prove to be invalid, the packet in question is to be discarded and a Validation Error flag raised. Local policy determines how this flag is to be handled and is outside the scope of this document.
Counter Mode Encryption
In both GCM and CCM, each outbound packet uses a 12-octet IV and an encryption key to form two outputs, a 16-octet first_key_block which is used in forming the authentication tag and a keystream of octets which is XORed to the plaintext to form cipher.
When GCM is used, the concatenation of a 12-octet IV (see sections 9.1 and 10.1)with a 4-octet block counter forms the input to AES. This is used to build a key_stream as follows:
def GCM_keystream( Plaintext, IV, Encryption_key ): assert len(plaintext) <= (2**36) -32 key_stream = "" block_counter = 1 first_key_block = AES_ENC( data=IV||block_counter, key=Encryption_key ) while len(key_stream) < len(Plaintext): block_counter = block_counter + 1 key_block = AES_ENC( data=IV||block_counter, key=Encryption_key ) key_stream = key_stream || key_block key_stream = truncate( key_stream, len(Plaintext) ) return (first_key_block, key_stream )
In AES-CCM counter mode encryption, the AES data input consists of the concatenation of a 1-octet flag,, a 12-octet IV, and a 3-octet block counter. Note that in this application the flag octet will always have the value 0x02 (see section 2. With any counter mode, if the same (IV, Encryption_key) pair is used twice, precisely the same keystream is formed. As explained in section 9.1 of RFC 3711, this is a cryptographic disaster. For AES-GCM, the consequences of such a reuse are even worse than explained in RFC 3711 because it would completely compromise the AES-GCM authentication mechanism.
AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12
AEAD_AES_128_CCM and AEAD_AES_256_CCM are defined in [RFC5116] with an authentication tag length of 16-octets. AEAD_AES_128_CCM_8 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_8 are defined in [RFC6655] with an authentication tag length of 8-octets. We require two new variants, AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12, with 12-octet authentication tags. In each case the authentication tag is formed by taking the 12 most significant octets (in network order) of the AEAD_AES_128/256_CCM authentication tag: +=====================+===========+==============+ | Name | Key Size | tag size (t) | +=====================+===========+==============+ | AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12 | 256 bits | 12 octets | | AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 | 128 bits | 12 octets | +=====================+===========+==============+ 8. Unneeded SRTP/SRTCP Fields AEAD counter mode encryption removes the need for certain existing SRTP/SRTCP mechanisms.
SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Field
The AEAD message authentication mechanism MUST be the primary message authentication mechanism for AEAD SRTP/SRTCP. Additional SRTP/SRTCP authentication mechanisms SHOULD NOT be used with any AEAD algorithm and the optional SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Tags are NOT RECOMMENDED and SHOULD NOT be present. Note that this contradicts section 3.4 of [RFC3711] which makes the use of the SRTCP Authentication field mandatory, but the presence of the AEAD authentication renders the older authentication methods redundant.
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Rationale. Some applications use the SRTP/SRTCP Authentication Tag as a means of conveying additional information, notably [RFC4771] . This document retains the Authentication Tag field primarily to preserve compatibility with these applications.
RTP Padding
Neither AES-GCM not AES-CCM requires that the data be padded out to a specific block size, reducing the need to use the padding mechanism provided by RTP. It is RECOMMENDED that the RTP padding mechanism not be used unless it is necessary to disguise the length of the underlying plaintext. Raw Data:
The optional 32-bit SRTP MKI and the 32-bit SRTP authentication tag (whose use is NOT RECOMMENDED). Since the AEAD cipher is larger than the plaintext by exactly the length of the AEAD authentication tag, the corresponding SRTP encrypted packet replaces the plaintext field by a slightly larger field containing the cipher. Even if the plaintext field is empty, AEAD encryption must still be performed, with the resulting cipher consisting solely of the authentication tag. This tag is to be When RFC 6904 is in use, a separate keystream is generated to encrypt selected RTP header extension elements. For the AEAD_AES_128_GCM and the AEAD_AES_128_CCM algorithms, this keystream MUST be generated in the manner defined in [RFC6904] using the AES_128_CM transform. For the AEAD_AES_256_GCM and the AEAD_AES_256_CCM algorithms, the keystream MUST be generated in the manner defined for the AES_256_CM transform. The originator must perform any required header extension encryption before the AEAD algorithm is invoked.
As with the other fields contained within the RTP header, both encrypted and unencrypted header extensions are to be treated by the AEAD algorithm as Additional Authenticated Data (AAD). Thus the AEAD algorithm does not provide any additional privacy for the header extensions, but does provide integrity and authentication.
Prevention of SRTP IV Reuse
In order to prevent IV reuse, we must ensure that the (ROC,SEQ,SSRC) triple is never used twice with the same master key. There are two phases to this issue.
Counter Management: A rekey MUST be performed to establish a new master key before the (ROC,SEQ) pair cycles back to its original value.
SSRC Management: For a given master key, the set of all SSRC values used with that master key must be partitioned into disjoint pools, one pool for each endpoint using that master key to originate outbound data. Each such originating endpoint MUST only issue SSRC values from the pool it has been assigned. Further, each originating endpoint MUST maintain a history of outbound SSRC identifiers that it has issued within the lifetime of the current master key, and when a new synchronization source requests an SSRC identifier it MUST NOT be given an identifier that has been previously issued. A rekey MUST be performed before any of the originating endpoints using that master key exhausts its pool of SSRC values. 
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Data Types in Encrypted SRTCP Compound Packets
When the encryption flag is set to 1, the SRTCP packet is broken into plaintext, associated data, and raw (untouched) data as listed below (see figure 4 ):
Associated Data: The packet version (2 bits), padding flag (1 bit), reception report count (5 bits), packet type (8 bits), length (2 octets), SSRC (4 octets), encryption flag (1 bit) and SRTCP index (31 bits).
Raw Data:
The 32-bit optional SRTCP MKI index and 32-bit SRTCP authentication tag (whose use is NOT RECOMMENDED).
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Plaintext: All other data.
Note that the plaintext comes in one contiguous field. Since the AEAD cipher is larger than the plaintext by exactly the length of the AEAD authentication tag, the corresponding SRTCP encrypted packet replaces the plaintext field with a slightly larger field containing the cipher. Even if the plaintext field is empty, AEAD encryption must still be performed, with the resulting cipher consisting solely of the authentication tag. This tag is to be placed immediately before the encryption flag and SRTCP index. 
Data Types in Unencrypted SRTCP Compound Packets
When the encryption flag is set to 0, the SRTCP compound packet is broken into plaintext, associated data, and raw (untouched) data as follows (see figure 5 ):
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Plaintext: None.
Raw Data:
Associated Data: All other data.
Even though there is no plaintext in this RTCP packet, AEAD encryption returns a cipher field which is precisely the length of the AEAD authentication tag. This cipher is to be placed before the Encryption flag and the SRTCP index in the authenticated SRTCP packet. A new master key MUST be established before the 31-bit SRTCP index cycles back to its original value. Ideally, a rekey performed should be performed and a new master key put in place well before the SRTCP index overflows.
The comments on SSRC management in section 9.3 also apply.
Constraints on AEAD for SRTP and SRTCP
In general, any AEAD algorithm can accept inputs with varying lengths, but each algorithm can accept only a limited range of lengths for a specific parameter. In this section, we describe the constraints on the parameter lengths that any AEAD algorithm must support to be used in AEAD-SRTP. Additionally, we specify a complete parameter set for two specific AEAD algorithms, namely AES-GCM and AES-CCM.
Generic AEAD Parameter Constraints
All AEAD algorithms used with SRTP/SRTCP MUST satisfy the three constraints listed below: The values for C_MAX are based on purely cryptographic considerations.
For sake of clarity we specify two additional parameters:
AEAD Authentication Tag Length MUST be either 8, 12, or 16 octets Maximum number of invocations MUST be at most 2^48 for SRTP for a given instantiation MUST be at most 2^31 for SRTCP Block Counter size MUST be 24 bits for CCM, MUST be 32 bits for GCM
The reader is reminded that the ciphertext is longer than the plaintext by exactly the length of the AEAD authentication tag.
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Internet Draft AES-GCM and AES-CCM for SRTP May 20, 2013 11.2. AES-GCM for SRTP/SRTCP AES-GCM is a family of AEAD algorithms built around the AES block cipher algorithm. AES-GCM uses AES counter mode for encryption and Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) for authentication. A detailed description of the AES-GCM family can be found in [RFC5116] . The following members of the AES-GCM family may be used with SRTP/SRTCP: Any implementation of AES-GCM SRTP SHOULD support both AEAD_AES_128_GCM_8 and AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8, and it MAY support the four other variants shown in table 1.
AES-CCM for SRTP/SRTCP
AES-CCM is another family of AEAD algorithms built around the AES block cipher algorithm. AES-CCM uses AES counter mode for encryption and AES Cipher Block Chaining Message Authentication Code (CBC MAC) for authentication. A detailed description of the AES-CCM family can be found in [RFC5116] . Four of the six CCM algorithms used in this document are defined in previous RFCs, while two, AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 and AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12, are defined in section 7 of this document. Any implementation of AES-CCM SRTP/SRTCP SHOULD support both AEAD_AES_128_CCM and AEAD_AES_256_CCM.
In addition to the flag octet used in counter mode encryption, AES-CCM authentications also uses a flag octet that conveys information about the length of the authentication tag, length of the May 20, 2013 block counter, and presence of additional authenticated data (see section 2.2 of [RFC3610] ). For AES-CCM in SRTP/SRTCP, the flag octet has the hex value 5A if an 8-octet AEAD authentication tag is used, 6A if a 12-octet AEAD authentication tag is used, and 7A if a 16-octet AEAD authentication tag is used. The flag octet is one of the inputs to AES during the counter mode encryption of the plaintext.
Key Derivation Functions
A Key Derivation Function (KDF) is used to derive all of the required encryption and authentication keys from a secret value shared by the endpoints. Both the AEAD_AES_128_GCM algorithms and the AEAD_AES_128_CCM algorithms MUST use the (128-bit) AES_CM_PRF Key Derivation Function described in [RFC3711] . Both the AEAD_AES_256_GCM algorithms and the AEAD_AES_256_CCM algorithms MUST use the AES_256_CM_PRF Key Derivation Function described in [RFC 6188].
Security Considerations
Handling of Security Critical Parameters
As with any security process, the implementer must take care to ensure cryptographically sensitive parameters are properly handled. Many of these recommendations hold for all SRTP cryptographic algorithms, but we include them here to emphasize their importance.
-If the master salt is to be kept secret, it MUST be properly erased when no longer needed. -The secret master key and all keys derived from it MUST be kept secret. All keys MUST be properly erased when no longer needed. -At the start of each packet, the block counter MUST be reset (to 0 for CCM, to 1 for GCM). The block counter is incremented after each block key has been produced, but it MUST NOT be allowed to exceed 2^32 for GCM and 2^24 for CCM. octets, significantly reducing the probability of an adversary successfully introducing fraudulent data. The goal of an authentication tag is to minimize the probability of a successful forgery occurring anywhere in the network we are attempting to defend. There are three relevant factors: how low we wish the probability of successful forgery to be (prob_success), how many attempts the adversary can make (N_tries) and the size of the authentication tag in bits (N_tag_bits). Then prob_success < expected number of successes = N_tries * 2^-N_tag_bits. Suppose an adversary wishes to introduce a forged or altered packet into a target network by randomly selecting an authentication value until by chance they hit a valid authentication tag. The table below summarizes the relationship between the number of forged packets the adversary has tried, the size of the authentication tag, and the probability of a compromise occurring (i.e. at least one of the attempted forgeries having a valid authentication tag). The reader is reminded that the forgery attempts can be made over the entire network, not just a single link, and that frequently changing the key does not decrease the probability of a compromise occurring. [RFC4568] defines SRTP "crypto suites"; a crypto suite corresponds to a particular AEAD algorithm in SRTP. In order to allow SDP to signal the use of the algorithms defined in this document, IANA will register the following crypto suites into the subregistry for SRTP crypto suites under the SRTP transport of the Internet Draft AES-GCM and AES-CCM for SRTP May 20, 2013 these profiles use AEAD algorithms, and thus do not use a separate auth_function, auth_key, or auth_tag. The term aead_auth_tag_length is used to emphasize that this refers to the authentication tag provided by the AEAD algorithm and that this tag is not located in the authentication tag field provided by SRTP/SRTCP. The SRTP encryption algorithm, session encryption key length, and AEAD authentication tag values received from MIKEY fully determine the AEAD algorithm (e.g., AEAD_AES_256_GCM_8). The exact mapping is described in section 15.
AEAD registry
We request that IANA make the following additions to the AEAD registry: AEAD_AES_128_CCM_12 = TBD AEAD_AES_256_CCM_12 = TBD 15. Parameters for use with MIKEY MIKEY specifies the algorithm family separately from the key length (which is specified by the Session Encryption key length ) and the authentication tag length (specified by AEAD Auth. tag length).
